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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the increase in the residual vote rate from 2012 to 
2016, when it increased from 0.99% to 1.87% nationwide.  It is reasonable to assume that this 
spike in the residual vote rate is due to a rise in abstentions.  However, there are currently other 
trends in election administration, such as an increasing reliance on vote-by-mail, that could also 
be driving up the residual vote rate.  And, even if the recent up-tick in the residual vote rate is 
primarily due to an increase in abstentions in 2016, it is not a priori obvious that the source of 
new abstentions was equally distributed among disaffected Democrats and Republicans.  The 
analysis in this paper relies on a combination of public opinion data and election returns to 
address these issues.  We find, first, that the increase in abstentions in 2016 was most likely due 
to disaffected Republicans, rather than an across-the-board phenomenon.  We also confirm that 
the increase in the 2016 residual vote rate was not due to changes in voting technologies between 
2012 and 2016.  We address three issues in the conclusion that this analysis raises: (1) the 
potential for the growth of protest voting in the U.S., (2) the likelihood that there is a significant 
under-reporting of voter abstentions in public opinion surveys, leaving a role for aggregate 
analysis to study this phenomenon, and (3) cautions about the use of the residual vote rate as a 
metric to gauge the accuracy of voting technologies. 
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When a voter fails to cast a vote for president, what does that signify?  Before the 2000 election, 
the lack of a vote for president was generally assumed to be an abstention — a choice 
consciously made by the voter.  The 2000 election changed all that.  The Florida recount, with its 
tales of hanging chad and butterfly ballots, alerted students of elections to the possibility that the 
lack of a vote for president might have nothing to do with voter choice at all, but rather the result 
of voter confusion or voting-machine malfunction. 
 The 2016 election draws attention back to abstention.  Among states that report the 
necessary information to calculate it, the residual vote rate rose to 1.87% in 2016, compared to 
0.99 % in 2012 and 1.05% over the past three presidential elections.1  As we show in this paper, 
this spike in the residual vote rate is unlikely to be due to the sudden failure of the nation’s 
voting machines. Rather, it is most likely due to a spike in abstentions, mostly Republicans 
unwilling to vote for Donald Trump. 
 The rise in the number of abstentions in the 2016 election has implications for the use of 
the residual vote rate to measure the performance of voting machines, which is how this metric 
was used immediately after the 2000 election (Alvarez et al 2004; Alvarez, Ansolabehere, and 
Stewart 2005; Ansolabehere 2000; Brady 2004; Herron and Sekhon 2005; Buchler, Jarvis, and 
McNulty2004; Stewart 2006), and is currently being used in the Elections Performance Index.2  
                                                 
1 To calculate the residual vote rate, a state needs to report turnout, beyond the number of votes cast for particular 
candidates.  As far as we can tell, Connecticut, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas did not 
report turnout in 2016. 
2 http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/elections-performance-index 
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Without implicit or explicit controls for abstention, the residual vote rate risks becoming an 
invalid measure of voting machine performance. 
 Conversely, the residual vote rate may be a valuable tool for measuring the degree of 
abstention at the top of the ballot in presidential elections.  As we show in this paper, the vote-
choice question in public opinion surveys appears to produce under-estimates of the abstention 
rate in the vote for president.  If we assume that year-to-year fluctuations in the residual vote rate 
(conditional on controlling for confounding factors such as machine performance) are primarily 
due to abstention, then a properly specified statistical model of the residual vote rate may be able 
to estimate the amount of abstention in any given presidential year. 
 This is the first iteration of analysis that attempts to build such a statistical model so that 
the degree of abstention in the 2016 presidential election can be better estimated.  The approach 
here is primarily inductive and exploratory. 
 The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  We start by reviewing two relevant 
literatures, studies of the residual vote rate and studies of abstention in presidential elections.  
We then examine the descriptive data concerning the residual vote rate, both temporally and 
cross-sectionally.  Following that, we explore the degree to which partisanship and ballot access 
laws influenced the residual vote rate in 2016.  Next, we place 2016 in a broader context by 
embedding it in a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis that examines the residual vote rate 
at the county level since 2000.  We conclude by discussing the substantive findings of the paper 
and proposing directions for future research. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3225197 
3 
 
I. Intellectual Background 
Residual votes and ballot roll-off 
The residual vote rate is a measure of voting machine accuracy that was initially championed by 
the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project in 2001, and has been widely used since then.3  
From the beginning, it has been recognized that the residual vote rate is due to the joint 
contribution of at least two major factors:  (1) intentional abstention by voters and (2) machine 
malfunctions.  Each of these major factors could have multiple sources.  For instance, abstention 
could be caused either by voter alienation or indifference.  (See the next subsection for a further 
discussion.)  Machine malfunctions could be due to outright failure, such as hanging chad or 
stripped gears on a mechanical lever machine, or voter confusion, such as presenting misleading 
ballot designs or using 4-point font to print candidate names.  Machine malfunctions could 
interact with administrative practices to amplify or diminish the residual vote rate. For instance, 
counties that diligently cleaned the holders of punch-card ballots after each election probably had 
lower residual vote rates than counties that let chad accumulate in the holders over time. 
 In addition to abstention and machine issues, there is the matter of administrative 
practice.  The 2000 election heightened the awareness of election administrators to the 
procedural factors that lead to the growth of residual votes.  This led many election jurisdictions 
to improve their voting-machine maintenance regimes.  It also led many to give greater oversight 
to the vote-counting process, to ensure that ballots were not overlooked on election night or 
during the canvass.  It is now clear, for instance, that some of the high residual vote rates found 
                                                 
3 In addition to the citations above, see Leib and Dittmer (2002), Kropf and Kimball (2013), Ansolabehere and 
Reeves (2004), Ansolabehere (2002), Alvarez, Beckett and Stewart (2013), Hanmer, Park, and Traugott (2010), 
Hanmer and Traugott (2004), Campbell and Byrne (2009), Everett, et al (2008), Sinclair and Alvarez (2004), 
McDonald (2010), Allers and Kooreman (2009) Bullock and Hood (2005), Damschroder (2013), and Warf (2006).  
In addition, the Help American Vote Act (Sec. 241(b)(17)) directs the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to 
conduct studies of voting machines to understand the factors that minimize the residual vote rate. 
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in Georgia in 2000 were due to some county officials just not diligently counting all the ballots 
they received (Stewart 2004).  Tightening up vote-counting procedures could easily have had the 
effect of reducing the residual vote rate after 2000, even without a change of voting equipment or 
tendency of voters to abstain. 
 The residual vote rate is closely related to another measure, ballot roll-off.  The two are 
related, but are distinguishable both in terms of conception and implementation. 
 Burnham (1965, p. 9) defined ballot roll-off as “the tendency of the electorate to vote for 
‘prestige’ offices but not for lower offices on the same ballot and at the same election.”  This 
quote nicely summarizes the conceptual and implementation differences between the residual 
vote and roll-off.  Conceptually, roll-off studies tended to focus on the issue of down-ballot 
“ballot fatigue,” that is, the tendency of voters to show up for the main event and then lose 
interest in the electoral undercard.  In terms of implementation, roll-off was measured as the 
difference between the number of votes cast for the top-of-the-ticket race (usually U.S. president, 
but possibly governor or U.S. senator) and votes cast for down-ballot races. 
 From a measurement perspective, the advantage of focusing on roll-off is that it allows 
the analysis of voting patterns in states that do not collect turnout data.  Not reporting turnout 
data as a separate statistic was common before 2000, but has become less common since then.  
However, the older roll-off measure is contaminated by factors related to machine performance, 
insofar as the baseline measure of turnout — total votes for the top-of-the-ballot race — has 
already been diminished by any mechanical or usability failures that may infect the entire ballot.  
As a consequence, ballot roll-off is generally a second-choice measure for studying issues of 
voting machine performance.   
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 Because of the advantages of the residual vote rate as an overall measure of voting 
machine performance, it has tended to supplant roll-off as a measure, even when the focus of 
study has been down-ballot races (e.g., Alvarez, Beckett and Stewart, 2013).  However, a few 
studies still rely on roll-off, especially when there is a desire to include data from states that do 
not gather and report turnout data (e.g., Reilly and Richey 2011). 
 
Abstention in presidential elections 
Electoral abstention fits within the large political science literature on turnout.  Failure to vote is, 
of course, one form of abstention.  The main theory framing the turnout literature is the “calculus 
of voting” suggested by Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and inspired by Downs (1957) which, in 
turn, has been adapted in many ways to focus on topics such as economic endowments of voters, 
candidate policy differences, and election administration practices. 
 Our interest in this paper is not on turnout per se, but what happens conditional on 
turnout.  In other words, we are interested in what happens when a voter has presumably decided 
that something makes it worthwhile to pay the cost of voting.  Therefore, the question becomes 
this:  once the voter has decided to stand in a voting booth or pull out the mail ballot, in which 
races will the vote mark a choice? 
The political science literature has tended to frame the issue of abstention-conditional-on-
turnout in terms of the probabilistic spatial model.  Two spatial dynamics are said to be at work 
in determining abstention, abstention due to alienation and abstention due to indifference.  In the 
former, a voter becomes more likely to abstain if all the candidates are viewed as ideologically 
distant from the voter.  In the latter, the voter will become more likely to abstain if all the 
candidates are seen as interchangeable.  Public opinion studies have found evidence of both 
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abstention-due-to-alienation and -indifference in presidential (Adams, Dow, and Merrill 2006) 
and U.S. Senate elections (Plane and Gershtenson 2004).  
Abstention-due-to-alienation and –indifference are at the root of the literature on protest 
voting, which has been primarily the subject of comparative politics.  The presence of blank, 
null, or spoiled (BNS) ballots has especially been notable in countries with compulsory voting.  
In many countries with compulsory voting laws, rates of BNS ballots — what we call the 
residual vote rate — are often quite high, and have often been interpreted as protest votes, that is, 
abstentions-due-to-alienation (Schwartzman 1973; Alves 1985; Kinzo 1988; Lamounier 1989; 
Power and Roberts1995).  However, it has also been observed that compulsory voting systems 
also tend to have higher residual vote rates in down-ballot contests, which is also consistent with 
abstention-due-to-indifference even in these countries. 
 
Empirical evidence from 2016.  Returning our focus to the United States, popular accounts of the 
2016 election provide reasons to believe that some number of voters (i.e., those who turned out, 
rather than stayed at home) abstained in the presidential race, for either alienation or indifference 
reasons, and that these numbers were higher than average.   
The case for abstention-due-to-alienation starts with the “disruptive” character of the 
Republican nominee, Donald Trump.  Fitting this assessment of Trump into the standard spatial 
model is less than straightforward, because Trump’s issue stances — at least at the beginning of 
his campaign — were an unorthodox package.  And yet this may be precisely the point of what 
makes abstention-due-to-alienation among Republicans a possibility — longtime, mainstream 
Republicans might have distrusted Trump, due to his initial advocacy of a mix of policies that 
combined populism, nationalism, xenophobia, and business libertarianism while also 
downplaying social issues like abortion and LGBTQ rights.  This is of course on top of questions 
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about Trump’s character, which likely drove some Republicans away from voting for him in the 
general election even when the issues he espoused were not alienating. 
 Evidence that Republican voters may have been alienated from voting for Trump shows 
up in two ways in public opinion research.  First, Republicans who supported candidates other 
than Trump in the primaries or caucuses were more likely to report abstaining in the general 
election, among respondents to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). 
(See Table 1.) 4 Among the 5,670 CCES respondents who reported they supported Trump in the 
primaries, precisely zero reported abstaining in November; Republican abstentions came entirely 
from non-Trump primary supporters. 
 
 Second, ideologically moderate Republicans were more likely to abstain in the general 
election than Republicans who occupied the far right of the ideological spectrum (Table 2).  
Leaving aside the small number of liberal Republicans who showed up in the survey, Republican 
                                                 
4 In Table 1 we have included responses from Republican identifiers who reported voting for a Democrat in the 
primaries for the sake of completeness.  Because such a small fraction of Republican identifiers voted for a 
Democrat in the primaries, we do not analyze those responses here. 
Table 1.  Reported abstention in the 2016 general election among Republicans given 
primary/caucus support. 
 
Candidate support Abstention pct. N 
Donald Trump 0.00% 5,670 
Ted Cruz 0.19% 2,866 
John Kasich 0.29% 1,016 
Marco Rubio 0.26% 1,137 
Another Republican 0.25% 618 
 
Total 
 
0.11% 
 
11,307 
 
Note:  Independent Republican leaners are included as Republicans.  The small number of 
respondents who reported voting for a Democratic candidate in the primaries/caucuses are 
excluded. 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
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Election Day abstainers tended to come from the middle-of-the-road/moderate-conservative side 
of the party, with abstention becoming less common as we move rightward. 
 The Democratic Party also had a disruptive candidate, although the nature of the 
disruption was different.  Bernie Sanders, the gadfly of the Democratic establishment, offered a 
platform that can be simply characterized as ideologically extreme, rather than the dog’s stew of 
issues chosen without regard to ideological coherence that characterized Trump’s initial policy 
positions.  Nonetheless, the animosity that grew up between supporters of Sanders and the 
eventual nominee, Hillary Clinton, suggested that Democrats might have been primed for its own 
form of abstention-due-to-alienation in the general election. 
 However, evidence from the CCES provides little support for such a neatly symmetrical 
view of what happened among the Democrats on this score.  For instance, Sanders’s primary 
voters reported abstaining at only a slightly greater rate than Clinton’s supporters once 
November rolled around (Table 3).  Thus, despite well-publicized lingering animosity among the 
Table 2.  Reported abstention in the 2016 general election among Republicans, given 
ideology. 
 
Respondent ideology Abstention pct. N 
Very liberal 0.00% 84 
Liberal 0.00% 137 
Somewhat liberal 0.00% 247 
Middle of the road 0.18% 2,628 
Somewhat conservative 0.26% 3,320 
Conservative 0.10% 6,225 
Very conservative 0.06% 3,479 
Not sure 0.00% 200 
 
Total 
 
0.14% 
 
16,320 
  
Note:  Independent Republican leaners are included as Republicans. 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
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Clinton and Sanders camps after the nomination was decided, at least among Democratic CCES 
respondents, this animosity failed to carry over into the November balloting. 
 Because Sanders clearly positioned himself on the far left of the Democratic Party, an 
abstention-through-alienation pattern in the general election among Democrats would have to 
show that leftist Democrats abstained in the general election at higher rates than moderates.  In 
fact, the opposite is true. If anything, centrist Democrats reported abstaining at greater rates than 
leftists on Election Day (Table 4).  However, this pattern is less pronounced than the Republican 
pattern. (See Figure 1 for a visual summary of Tables 2 and 4.)  
Table 3.  Reported abstention in the 2016 general election among Democrats given 
primary/caucus support. 
 
Candidate support Abstention pct. N 
Hillary Clinton 0.05% 9,201 
Bernie Sanders 0.07% 6,022 
 
Total 
 
0.05% 
 
15,223 
 
Note:  Independent Democratic leaners are included as Democrats.  The small number of 
respondents who reported voting for a Republican candidate in the primaries/caucuses or 
another Democrat are excluded. 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
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Table 4.  Reported abstention in the 2016 general election among Democrats, given 
ideology. 
 
Respondent ideology Abstention pct. N 
Very liberal 0.04% 4,061 
Liberal 0.01% 6,085 
Somewhat liberal 0.12% 3,877 
Middle of the road 0.11% 5,242 
Somewhat conservative 0.02% 970 
Conservative 0.00% 816 
Very conservative 0.00% 436 
Not sure 0.00% 484 
 
Total 
 
0.06% 
 
21,971 
  
Note:  Independent Democratic leaners are included as Democrats. 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
 
Figure 1.  Reported abstention in the 2016 election by Democratic and Republican 
identifiers, by ideology. 
 
 
Source:  CCES 2016, Common content 
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 Turning to the issue of abstention due to indifference, this phenomenon should manifest 
itself in the general election among voters who reported seeing no ideological difference between 
the two nominees, Trump and Clinton.  This is easy to test, by first calculating the absolute 
difference in respondents’ placements of the two major-party candidates on the standard 7-point 
ideological scale, and then examining the abstention rate as a function of perceived ideological 
difference.   
 The results of this simple test are reported in Table 5.  Among those who saw no 
ideological difference between the candidates, the abstention rate was much higher than if even a 
slight difference was perceived.  And, there is an order-of-magnitude difference between those 
who saw only a minor ideological difference between the candidates (3 points or fewer) and 
those who saw a major difference (4 points or greater).  
 Of course, this is an overly simple test of abstention-due-to-indifference, for at least two 
reasons.  First, the flow of causality is ambiguous — a respondent might just as easily rationalize 
abstention by simply stating she saw no ideological difference between the two candidates as be 
drawn to abstain because she saw no difference.  Second, failure to see big ideological 
Table 5.  Reported abstention in the 2016 general election as a function of perceived 
ideological distance between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. 
 
Absolute difference 
on 7-point scale Abstention pct. N 
0 0.36% 1,573 
1 0.18% 2,941 
2 0.21% 5,164 
3 0.15% 8,474 
4 0.04% 9,206 
5 0.04% 6,152 
6 0.06% 2,202 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
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differences between Trump and Clinton is likely to be a proxy for inattention to politics which, 
itself, is a likely cause of abstention.   
 We conclude this section by placing the preceding discussion about abstention in the 
2016 presidential election in a multivariate statistical context.  Here, the dependent variable is the 
“abstention” indicator and the independent variables are (1) indicators for primary/caucus 
support, (2) self-reported ideology, and (3) perceived ideological differences between the 
candidates.  To simplify interpretation, we exclude respondents whose party identification does 
not match their ideology.  (For instance, we exclude all self-reported liberal Republicans and 
conservative Democrats.)  We also exclude self-identified independents and members of minor 
parties. 
 We performed the estimation using both probit and linear probability models and report 
the results in Table 6.5 Comparing the probit and linear probability analyses, three effects 
consistently stand out:  (1) Republicans were more likely to abstain than Democrats, (2) 
Republicans who supported Trump in the primary were less likely to abstain than Republicans 
who supported other candidates, and (3) respondents who saw big ideological differences 
between Trump and Clinton were less likely to abstain.   
                                                 
5 We performed a linear probability analysis because being a Trump support in the primary perfectly predicted not 
abstaining; thus, these observations were excluded in the probit analysis.  The linear probability analysis allows us to 
take into account these Trump supporters. 
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 Using the coefficients from the linear probability model, it appears that being a 
Republican had the biggest effect on abstention among these three factors.  Republicans were 
0.59 percentage points more likely to abstain than Democrats, Republicans who supported 
Trump in the primary were 0.29 points less likely to abstain, and respondents who perceived a 
maximal ideological difference between Clinton and Trump were 0.37 percentage points more 
Table 6.  Probability of respondents reporting they abstained in the 2016 presidential 
election. 
 
 Probit Linear probability 
Republican (Democrat excluded 
category) 
 
1.13*** 
(0.30) 
0.0059*** 
(0.0021) 
Republican voted for Trump in 
primary 
 
— -0.0029*** 
(0.0005) 
Democrat voted for Sanders in 
primary 
 
0.14 
(0.19) 
0.0003 
(0.0006) 
Republican ideology (positive = 
conservative) 
 
-0.069 
(0.042) 
-0.00047 
(0.00033) 
Democratic ideology (positive = 
conservative) 
 
0.074* 
(0.034) 
0.00019 
(0.00013) 
Perceived ideological difference b/t 
Trump & Clinton 
 
-0.13*** 
(0.03) 
-0.00062*** 
(0.00018) 
Intercept 
 
 
-3.07*** 
(0.20) 
0.0021** 
(0.0008) 
N 25,180 30,511 
Llf -302.54 — 
R2 0.064 (pseudo) 0.0019 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Source:  2016 CCES, Common Content 
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likely to abstain than respondents who saw no difference.6  Sanders supporters in the primaries 
were not more likely to abstain than Clinton supporters, all things equal, nor were Republican 
moderates.  Ideology was barely statistically significant in the probit analysis, and insignificant 
in the linear probability analysis. 
 Thus, to the degree that the individual-level analysis tells a consistent story, Republicans 
were more likely to abstain in 2016, especially those who had opposed Trump in the primaries.  
Regardless of party, those who perceived big ideological differences between Trump and Clinton 
were less likely to abstain. 
 There is one important detail in the analysis summarized in Table 6 that give us pause, 
which is the lack of variability in the dependent variable:  only 0.11% of respondents (52 
weighted and 81 unweighted observations, out of 45,242 observations overall).  Not only is this a 
small number of observations to hang the individual-level analysis on, it is an especially low 
number of abstainers, given the patterns in the aggregate election returns.7  In the next section, 
we will argue that the aggregate data suggest that the Election Day abstention rate was closer to a 
full percentage point nationwide, not a tenth of a percentage point, and could have been as high 
as two percentage points in some places.   
 Thus, the individual analysis gives us clues about where we might find higher residual 
vote rates (i.e. in strong Republican areas and areas that supported Trump’s opponents in the 
primaries), but beyond that, what we can learn about abstention in the 2016 election using public 
opinion data appears to be limited. 
 
                                                 
6 This last effect was estimated by multiplying the perceived ideological difference coefficient (-0.00062) by the 
maximum ideological difference (6). 
7 It is unclear whether the under-reporting of abstention on public opinion surveys in the 2016 presidential election 
is confined to the CCES.  For instance, the sequence of questions in the ANES about vote choice does not allow the 
respondent to report voting in the election, but abstaining in the presidential race. 
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II. The 2016 Residual Vote Rate in Context 
We turn now to the residual vote rate.  The residual vote rate for president is defined as 
 100 ൈ ை௩௘௥	௩௢௧௘௦	௙௢௥	௣௥௘௦௜ௗ௘௡௧ା௨௡ௗ௘௥	௩௢௧௘௦	௙௢௥	௣௥௘௦௜ௗ௘௡௧்௨௥௡௢௨௧ .  Because few jurisdictions report over- 
and under-votes, it is usually necessary to calculate the residual vote rate as  
100 ൈ ቀ1 െ ்௢௧௔௟	௩௢௧௘௦	௙௢௥	௣௥௘௦௜ௗ௘௡௧௜௔௟	௖௔௡ௗ௜ௗ௔௧௘௦்௨௥௡௢௨௧ ቁ.   
 The national residual vote rate time series that runs from 1988 to 2016 (Figure 2) shows a 
clear break after 2000, which in large part was caused by a combination of new voting machines 
and other administrative changes that occurred following 2000.  In the years immediately 
preceding (and including) 2000, the residual vote rate hovered around 2%.  It was cut in half in 
the year immediately after 2000, with the rate spiking back up to near 2% in 2016.  As we show 
below, the 2016 spike cannot be attributed to a change in voting technologies between 2012 and 
2016, and therefore is likely to be due to a rise in abstentions in 2016. 
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 The average residual vote rate from 2004 to 2012 was 1.05%; the residual vote rate in 
2016 was 1.87%.  The difference, 0.82 percentage points, is a good starting point for quantifying 
the increase in abstentions in 2016 compared to the immediate past.  This increase is on top of 
any pre-existing abstention rate that was included in the residual vote rate.  Because the baseline 
abstention rate in prior elections has been estimated to be around 0.5% (Stewart 2014), it is 
reasonable to assume for starters that the 2016 abstention rate was a bit over 1% nationwide.  In 
the previous section we reported that only 0.11% of CCES respondents reported abstaining in 
2016.  At least provisionally, it seems that the survey response produced a significant under-
reporting of abstentions. 
Figure 2.  Residual vote rate nationwide in presidential elections, 1988–2016. 
 
Source:  Election Data Services (1988–2000); the authors (2004–2016) 
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 Figure 3 presents scatterplots that compare the residual vote rates in 2016 and 2012 at the 
county and state levels (Figures 3a and 3b, respectively).  To aid in legibility, cube roots have 
been taken of the percentages in the county graph.  Overall, there are moderate-sized correlations 
across time at both levels of aggregation:  r = .25 in the case of counties and r = .70 in the case of 
states.8  The presence of moderately high correlations at the state and county levels of residual 
vote rates between 2012 and 2016 suggest that underlying the residual vote rate in any given 
jurisdiction is a set of legal, administrative, and cultural practices that are slow to change across 
adjacent presidential election cycles.   
 Inspection of the graphs in Figure 3 reveals that the residual vote rate went up in the great 
majority of counties (1,754 of 2,452) and states (37 of 45).  This is good preliminary evidence 
                                                 
8 The correlations are calculated weighting by turnout in 2016.  The correlations using the cube-root transformations 
is r = .45 for the counties. 
Figure 3.  Comparison of residual vote rate, 2016 vs. 2012.   
 
a. Counties (data transformed by taking cube-
roots) 
b. States 
Source:  Data gathered by the authors 
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that the residual vote rate spike in 2016 had some common nationwide root.  However, the 
increase was greater in some states and counties than in others, which also suggests that 
variations in short-term political factors that affected some parts of the country more than others 
also were in play, too. 
 
A side note about Nevada 
Before proceeding with the nationwide analysis of the residual vote rate, we pause to consider 
the case of Nevada.  Nevada is interesting because in the 1970s it provided a ballot mechanism 
that allows voters to register an abstention in the presidential race, by offering the choice of 
“none of these candidates” (NOTC).  Presumably, voters making this choice would have 
abstained if they had voted in any other states.9  Therefore a comparison of Nevada’s residual 
vote rate over time alongside its “none of these candidates” rate (we will call this the “none 
rate”) is instructive.10 
 Figure 4 shows the relevant Nevada time series going back to 1964.  The NOTC option 
was first offered in presidential elections in 1976, so the none rate is shown starting then.  
Interestingly, the onset of the NOTC option in 1976 did not obviously depress the residual vote 
rate in that year, which suggests that in years prior to that, most voters who would have abstained 
in the presidential contest just stayed home instead.  From that time to 2012, both the residual 
vote rate and the none rate gradually declined, to the point that in 2012, the residual vote rate in 
Nevada was 0.17% and the none rate was 0.57%, totaling 0.74%. In 2016, the residual vote rate 
only ticked up a small amount, to 0.18%, but the none rate spiked to 2.56%, for an increase of 
nearly 2 percentage points.   
                                                 
9 It is also likely that at least some of the Nevada voters who vote for “none of these candidates” would have failed 
to turnout in another state that did not offer the choice.   
10 For research into Nevada’s NOTC option, see Damore, Waters and Bowler (2012). 
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 It is instructive to speculate about what would have happened if Nevada did not have the 
NOTC option in the 2016 election.  Presumably, some of the voters who chose NOTC for 
president in 2016 would have stayed home if it had not been offered as a choice.  However, 
others would have shown up, either out of civic duty or interest in down-ballot races, and would 
have presumably abstained in the presidential contest.  Distinguishing between these two actions 
is a tricky methodological question, and one in principle that has implications for how we think 
about abstentions in all states. 
 
Figure 4.  Residual vote and none-of-these-candidate vote in Nevada presidential 
elections, 1964–2016. 
 
Source:  Nevada Secretary of State. 
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Summary 
The residual vote rate in 2016 returned to levels not seen since the days of Bush v. Gore.  The 
dramatic surge in the NOTC vote in Nevada, but not the residual vote rate, provides direct 
evidence that at least in one state, there was a surge in the number of voters who purposefully 
refused to vote for one of the candidates on the ballot.  With the NOTC option unavailable 
anywhere other than Nevada, the only option for disaffected voters elsewhere was to abstain, if 
they turned out to vote at all.  However, at the same time, the residual vote rate showed a healthy 
degree of autocorrelation with levels seen in 2012.  This further suggests that there still exist 
persistent factors that contribute to the residual vote rate that are beyond the reach of short-term 
political forces. 
 
III. Partisanship, Ballot Access Laws, and the Residual Vote Rate in 2016 
In this section, we turn our attention to the residual vote rate and how it varied across-sectionally 
in 2016, both at the state and county levels.  We start with cross-sectional analysis so that we can 
ultimately test specific partisan hypotheses that might explain variation in the residual vote rate 
in 2016 but not in other years. 
 Maps describing the geographic distribution of the residual vote rate in 2016, at both the 
county and state levels, are provided in Figure 5.  Six states (Connecticut, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas) do not reliably report turnout rates statewide, so are shaded 
gray in both maps.  Alaska does report turnout.  However, its election returns are reported by 
state senate district, which hinders allocating the residual vote rate into that state’s boroughs. 
 A comparison of the two maps in Figure 5 reveals, first, that residual vote variation 
within most states was much less pronounced than variation between states.  This suggests that 
any explanations for why the residual vote rate varies will need to account for factors such as 
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legal regimes and administrative practices that are often determined by state legislatures.  Both 
maps show that the highest residual vote rates in 2016  tended to be in the western states, with 
lower residual vote rates in the southeast.  While this pattern is somewhat correlated with 
strength shown in the primaries by Donald Trump, it is also correlated with the use of vote-by-
mail, which has previously been shown to be correlated with higher residual vote rates, as well.  
(We address these issues below.)  
The two major categories of explanations about variations in the residual vote rate have 
focused on the accuracy of voting machines, and on the behavior of voters.  For the remainder of 
this section, we start by examining the relationship between the 2016 geographic variations in 
the residual vote rate as a function of voting technology, before turning our attention to non-
technology-related explanations. 
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Figure 5.  Residual vote rate, 2016 
 
a. By county 
 
 
 
b. By state 
 
 
Source:  Data gathered by authors 
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Voting technology and the residual vote in 2016 
The literature on the relationship between voting technology and the residual vote rate that 
emerged immediately after 2000 found that older technologies, especially punch-card machines, 
had significantly higher residual vote rates than newer technologies.  Once New York retired its 
mechanical lever machines for federal elections in 2012, all of the antiquated machines that had 
been used in 2000 were finally retired from service.  Prior research has generally found little-to-
no difference in residual vote rates when comparing electronic voting machines (DREs) and 
optically scanned paper ballots.  Because virtually all votes are now cast on one of these two 
technologies, it is a priori unlikely that cross-county variation in the residual vote rate in 2016 
would be strongly related to voting technology.  Nonetheless, voting technology is one factor we 
need to test for. 
 In a simple bivariate test, the residual vote rate in 2016 was slightly greater in counties 
that used optical scanners than in counties that used DREs.  The residual vote rate in optical 
scanning counties was 1.45%, compared to 1.20% in counties that used DREs.11  A simple t-test 
rejects the null hypothesis that these percentages are equal at a p value of < .0005.  However, this 
difference in the residual vote rate across the two major types of voting machines may simply be 
an artifact of the types of machines used in different states.  If we conduct this simple statistical 
test in the context of a (state-level) fixed-effects regression, DREs now have a higher average 
residual vote rate than optical scanners, by 0.15 percentage points.12 
                                                 
11 There were 1,607 and 724 counties that used optical scanners and DREs, respectively.  In addition, the average 
residual vote rate for the 42 counties that used hand-counted paper was 2.20%; the average residual vote rate for the 
78 counties that used a mix of technologies was 1.67%.  Averages here, and elsewhere in the paper, are calculated 
after weighting by turnout. 
12 The t-statistic testing the difference in residual vote rates between DREs and optical scanners in the fixed-effects 
regression is 2.73, p = .006. 
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 As has been shown in past work (e.g., Ansolabehere and Stewart 2004), the estimated 
effects of voting technologies on the residual vote rate can be sensitive to specification, 
especially in cross-sectional analysis.  Thus we should be especially careful in drawing 
conclusions about the effect of voting machines on the residual vote rate in 2016. 
 
Voter abstention in the 2016 presidential election:  the role of party faction, election law, and 
voter strategy 
Turning to explanations of voter abstention, we focus on four major factors, one behavioral, two 
legal, and the fourth strategic.  The first factor, which we term behavioral, is the relative distaste 
partisans felt for the major-party nominees, especially the nominees of their own party.  The 
second and third factors, which we term legal, are (1) the ability of voters to write in presidential 
candidates if they find the nominated candidates unpalatable and (2) the extent of mail-ballot use 
in a state.  The fourth factor, which we categorize as  strategic, is the partisan balance in a state, 
which might make voters more or less likely to mark their ballot in an expressive, rather than 
narrowly instrumental way. 
 
Behavioral reasons for abstention. If some voters abstained because of their distaste for one or 
more of the candidates on the ballot, then we should see more abstentions where support for 
those candidates is weakest.  More specifically, if some fraction of Republicans — presumably 
more moderate “mainstream” Republicans — found voting for Trump unpalatable, and if those 
same Republicans could not bring themselves to vote for Clinton (or any of the other candidates), 
then we would expect for abstentions to be higher in counties where Trump’s support among 
Republicans was the softest.  A similar argument could be made about “Sanders Democrats.” We 
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operationalized strength of support for the party nominees by using the county-level vote shares 
received by Trump and Sanders in the Republican and Democratic primaries, respectively.   
 Support for Trump and Sanders in the primaries was likely correlated with overall 
partisan strength within a county.  Therefore, it was important for us to control for partisan 
strength, which we did by taking the average of the vote received by Republican candidates in 
each county from 2000 to 2012.13  To allow for the possibility that more staunchly partisan areas 
may be more likely to stand by their party’s candidate, we also included the square of the 
Republican-strength variable. 
 We conducted the analysis in a multiple regression framework with state-level fixed 
effects.  The fixed effects help to account for unmeasured legal, administrative, and cultural 
factors that had a common influence on the residual vote rate in 2016 beyond the behavioral 
factors we explore here.  State-level fixed effects also help us to account for different mixes of 
candidates who were on the various primary ballots in the states, and the different time of the 
year when the primaries were held in the states.14  In addition, because we are running state-level 
fixed effects, we can include states that did not have primaries, but rather held caucuses.  For 
these states, support for Trump and Sanders is set to zero for each county.  These states’ 
observations do not contribute to the analysis about the correlation between the residual vote rate 
and support for Trump/Sanders, but they do contribute to the analysis about the correlation 
between the residual vote rate and historical partisan voting patterns. 
 Table 7 reports the results of the analysis.  The strongest effect is related to partisan 
strength.  The combination of the two Republican-strength variables indicates a symmetrical 
                                                 
13 That is, the “Republican strength” variable was the average vote share of George Bush (2000 and 2004), John 
McCain (2008) and Mitt Romney (2012). 
14 In other words, with state-level fixed effects, the correlations we observe between the residual vote rate and either 
support for Trump/Sanders or local historical partisan support are largely within-state correlations among each 
states’ counties. 
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curvilinear relationship, with the highest residual vote rates coming in counties with evenly split 
partisanship.15  Interestingly, counties that gave Trump his highest vote totals in the primary 
were no more or less likely to cast blank ballots in the general election.  Just as interestingly, 
counties that gave Sanders their greatest support in the primaries were less likely to cast residual 
votes in November. 
 At least in this aggregate cross-sectional analysis, we see little support for standard 
stories arising from the 2016 election that would link party factionalism to general election 
abstention.  Counties that rejected Trump in the primaries were no more likely to see abstentions 
                                                 
15 Taking first derivatives and setting them to zero, the maximum of the Republican strength effect occurs when 
average Republican vote share is 54.0%. 
Table 7.  Regression predicting residual vote rate as a function of Republican strength 
in a county and vote for Trump and Sanders in nominating primaries.  State fixed 
effects. 
 
Variables 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Trump primary share -0.0020 
(0.0024) 
Sanders primary share -0.0095** 
(0.0029) 
Republican strength 0.040*** 
(0.007) 
Republican strength2 -0.037*** 
(0.007) 
Constant 0.0087*** 
(0.0020) 
N 1,566 
R2 .54 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Source:  Data gathered by the authors. 
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than counties that embraced him, while counties that embraced Sanders were less likely to see 
high rates of abstention. 
 
The availability of minor-party and write-in options.  Abstention may not be the only option 
available to disaffected partisans.  First, disaffected partisans might vote for minor-party 
candidates, such as Libertarian Gary Johnson or Independent Evan McMullin (for Republicans) 
or Green Jill Stein (for Democrats).  Second, disaffected partisans might write in another 
candidate.  In either case, the ability to vote for a minor-party candidate or write in a candidate 
depends on ballot access laws in the voter’s state. 
 Third-party options were readily available in 2016.  On the right side of the ideological 
spectrum, the Libertarian Party was on the ballot of every state, while Evan McMullin was an 
official option in 42 states, either because he was on the ballot (11 states) or a certified write-in 
(31 states). 16  On the left, the Green Party was on the ballot in 44 states.  Hence, there was at 
least one high-visibility alternative on the ballot for many Republicans and Democrats in 
virtually every state, and in many states, there was a second high-visibility alternative candidate 
for Republicans to choose from.  In addition, the third-party options extended to lesser-known 
non-major candidates, such as Darrell Castle (Constitution Party), Gloria LaRiva (Socialism and 
Liberation), and Rocky de la Fuente (American Delta). 
 Based on the election returns, 6.04% of voters took advantage of one of these minor-party 
candidates in 2016, well over the 3.75% of the vote that went to minor-party candidates in 
2012.17  (See Figure 6.)  While these percentages are nowhere close to years like 1968, 1992, and 
1996, they did approach the 8.24% level for the minor-party vote in 1980, when John Anderson  
                                                 
16 https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_for_presidential_candidates. 
17 These election return statistics are taken from David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 
https://uselectionatlas.org. 
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received 6.6% of the vote against Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter.  Gary Johnson received 
3.27% of the nationwide popular vote in 2016, while Evan McMullin received another 0.53%, 
and the right-wing Constitution-Party candidate Darrell Castle received 0.15%.  The only major 
presence on the left among minor-party candidates was the Green’s Jill Stein, at 1.06% of the 
vote.  Even if we apportion all the remaining minor-party candidates to the left, that leaves 
4.01% of the nationwide popular vote going to right-wing minor-party candidates and 2.03% 
going to left-wing minor-party candidates. In short, if abstention was disproportionately a 
Republican behavior in 2016, so was voting for minor-party candidates. 
 
Figure 6.  Percent of the national presidential vote received by non-major-party 
candidates, 1960–2016. 
 
Source:  Dave Leip’s Presidential Atlas 
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 In addition to alternatives on the ballot, voters can often write in a candidate rather than 
choose among names presented to them.  In 2016, only nine states18 prohibited write-in 
candidates.19  The remaining states allowed them, with 33 having some form of registration in 
order for the votes to be reported separately, and nine (including D.C.) allowing write ins without 
a provision for registration.20   
 Although most states allow write-in votes for president, it must be remembered that 
write-in votes can be hard to count, since they typically require hand tabulation.  Because of this 
extra effort to count, and the unlikelihood that write-in votes will be cast for the winner, they 
often go uncounted by precinct workers even when the state allows for write-ins.  In a recent 
paper by about the 2016 recount in Wisconsin, for instance, it was discovered that the largest 
discrepancies between the election-night vote tally and the recounted vote were due to the failure 
of many municipalities to count all their write-in votes, if they counted them at all (Ansolabehere 
et al 2017).   
 Based on the tendency of poll workers to undercount write-in votes, it is easy to see how 
liberal write-in laws could actually result in a high residual-vote rate, even (or especially) if 
disaffected voters choose to write in a candidate rather than abstain.  Stated another way, when 
there is an increase in disaffected voters who come to the polls (rather than stay at home) and 
write in a minor-party candidate, the residual vote rate will go up if poll workers do not become 
much more diligent in counting write-in votes. 
                                                 
18 Arkansas, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and South Dakota. 
19 We developed these categories through triangulating among a number of sources, including Ballotpedia and state 
election Websites.   
20 These latter nine states were Alabama, D.C., Iowa, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and Vermont. 
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 Of course, a highly publicized write-in campaign could spur election officials to be more 
aggressive in training their poll workers to count write-in votes, and thus an increase in write-in 
votes could cause the residual vote rate to decline.  Whether an up-tick in write-in votes 
increases or decreases residual votes is therefore an empirical question. 
 In the case of 2016, it appears that easy access to the write-in option ended up increasing 
the residual vote rate.  When we divide states into the three categories based on write-in laws 
discussed above, states that did not allow any write-ins had average residual vote rates of 0.95%, 
compared to 1.33% in states that allowed write-ins without pre-registering and 1.44% in states 
that required pre-filing of write-in candidates.  These differences between states, of course, may 
be due to spurious correlation.  Still, at first look, it is not obvious that liberal write-in laws made 
it more likely that write-in votes would actually be counted. 
 
Mail ballots and residual votes. With our focus on the role of abstention in producing the 2016 
spike in the residual vote rate, it is possible for us to ignore other changes in the electoral 
landscape that may also be increasing the residual vote rate over time.  One important factor is 
the increased use of the mails to deliver and return ballots in recent years.  This increase is due to 
the confluence of a number of factors, the most important being the demise of “for-excuse” 
absentee ballot laws, the rise of permanent absentee ballot lists, and the increase in the number of 
states that deliver all their ballots by mail.  Using responses to the Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement, the percentage of voters using the mails 
to return ballots doubled from 2000 to 2012, growing from 10.2% of voters to 21.1%. 
 Even in the absence of the abstention hypothesis, our previous research leads us to expect 
that the increase in voting by mail would cause the residual vote rate to increase.  In particular, 
Alvarez, Beckett and Stewart (2013) found that the rise of vote-by-mail in California over a two-
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decade period led to a significant rise in the residual vote rate in that state — a rise that was 
masked by a reduction in the residual vote rate caused by the retirement of punch-card and 
mechanical lever machines.  Stated another way, the residual vote rate gains made in the Golden 
State were taken away entirely by the state’s liberalization of its absentee-ballot laws. 
 The mechanisms linking the rise of vote-by-mail with an increase in the residual vote rate 
are straightforward.  The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) mandated that in-person voters, on 
Election Day or during early voting, be notified if their ballots contained an over- or under-vote.  
Vote-by-mail voters are afforded no “second-look” at their ballot.  Even voters in VBM states 
who return their ballots in person, which accounts for about half the voters in these states, drop 
off their ballots without scanning them personally, and thus without being warned of an 
inadvertent marking error at the top of the ballot.  Furthermore, the processing of postal mail 
introduces the possibility of stray marks being added to mail-in ballots, especially when the 
ballots are folded. 
 Thus, there is likely to be a direct effect between the use of the mails to vote and the rise 
of the residual vote rate.  There may also be indirect effects, although we are less certain about 
the signs of those effects.  One could argue, for instance, that delivering the ballot to every voter 
in a state weeks before the election could prompt disaffected voters to seek out alternatives to 
abstaining more diligently, and thus a rise in voting by mail might attenuate the positive 
correlation between mail ballots and residual votes.  On the whole, these types of indirect effects 
are currently speculative and likely to be weak in any case.  For that reason, we focus our 
attention here on the direct effect. 
 Because the use of mail ballots is determined so strongly by state law, it makes little 
sense to explore the nationwide cross-sectional relationship between the residual vote rate and 
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the fraction of ballots cast by mail at the county level.   Thus, we focus here on exploring the 
relationship at the state level. 
 In 2016, the correlation between the residual vote rate and the fraction of ballots cast by 
mail was quite high (r = .59).  This correlation was much weaker in 2012 and non-existent before 
then, as is illustrated by the scatterplots in Figure 7 and the regressions in Table 8.21   
 
                                                 
21 There is a significant right-skew to the variable measuring mail-ballot use.  However, transforming the data, for 
instance, by taking logarithms, does not change the substantive conclusions reported here. 
Figure 7.  Relationship between residual vote rate and fraction of votes cast by mail, 
2000–2016. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration 
Supplement, various years; Election data gathered by authors 
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 This analysis urges caution in jumping to the conclusion that the only source of an 
increase in the residual vote in 2016 was abstention-due-to-alienation.  At least some of this 
increase could have been due to the coincident rise in vote-by-mail.   
 
Strategy and the casting of “wasted votes.” Finally, going to the polls and abstaining in the 
presidential race, or voting for a minor-party candidate, is likely to be influenced by the 
competitive environment of the state in which a voter lives.  Despite the unlikelihood that any 
individual vote will be determinative in a race, many voters act as if their one vote will determine 
the outcome of an election, especially when it is perceived to be close.  In other words, many 
voters will act strategically when the situation calls for it (Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006). 
 If abstention is one of the available choices among those who come to the polls, and if at 
least some voters see a trade-off between their vote being expressive and their vote determining 
the outcome of the election, then we could imagine that abstention would be less in a highly 
competitive state compared to a non-competitive state. 
Table 8.  Regression of residual vote rate on fraction of ballots cast by mail at the state 
level, 2000–2016. 
 
 Year 
 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Ballots cast 
by mail 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.0054**
(0.0020) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
Intercept 2.06*** 
(0.19) 
1.09*** 
(0.12) 
1.07 
(0.09) 
0.83*** 
(0.06) 
1.04*** 
(0.12) 
R2 .05 .00 .00 .20 .35 
Adj. R2 .02 -.03 -.02 .18 .34 
N 38 39 42 44 45 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Voting and Registration 
Supplement, various years; Election data gathered by authors 
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 The simplest way to test this notion in the 2016 election is to examine the correlation 
between the residual vote rate and the Trump-Clinton electoral margin across the states.  The 
results, which are illustrated in Figure 8, are consistent with the idea that voters take into account 
the strategic circumstances when they decide whether to abstain.  Here, we have plotted the 
residual vote rate of each state in 2016 against the percentage margin-of-victory enjoyed by 
Trump (red squares) and Clinton (blue circles).  (The sizes of the data tokens are proportional to 
the number of voters.) While there is considerable variation around the best-fit line, the 
correlation is moderately high (r = .43) and the t-score of the line’s slope is over 3.22  The 
District of Columbia is the obvious outlier in the graph, but its small relative turnout means that 
removing it from the analysis barely changes the results, and if anything, strengthens them.23 
                                                 
22 More precisely, the best-fit line’s equation is y = 1.03 (0.16) + 0.025 (0.008) x, with R2 = .19 and n = 45. 
(Standard errors of coefficient are in parentheses.)  Observations are weighted by turnout in 2016.   
23 With DC excluded, the best-fit line’s equation is y = 0.97 (0.16) + 0.029 (0.008) x, with R2 = .23 and n = 44. 
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 In addition, 2016 appears to be the only year in recent history in which there has been a 
statistically significant association between the residual vote rate and the two-party margin of 
victory.  Table 9 displays the results of a series of regressions that establish this finding, while 
Figure 9 displays the data.  In the simple bivariate analysis, 2016 is the only year since 2000 in 
which the residual vote rate has been lower in low-margin (“battleground”) states than in high-
margin states. 
Figure 8.  Correlation between the residual vote rate and two-party margin-of-victory in 
each state, 2016. 
 
Sources:  Data gathered by the authors and Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. 
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Figure 9.  Correlation between the residual vote rate and two-party margin-of-victory in 
each state, 2000–2016. 
 
 
 
Sources:  Data gathered by the authors and Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. 
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 Considered all together, then, it does appear that the tendency to abstain in 2016 was 
tempered by the competitive environment voters found themselves in.  In more competitive, 
battleground states, abstaining or voting for a minor-party candidate could more likely lead to an 
even-more-disliked electoral outcome.   
 Of course, this analysis begs the question of why voters may have been more sensitive to 
the strategic environment when deciding whether to abstain in 2016 than in the recent past, when 
there has been similar attention to results in a limited number of competitive states.  Responding 
to this question is a task to be addressed in future research. 
  
Summary 
The analysis presented in this section has offered a preliminary look at the cross-sectional 
relationship between the residual vote rate in 2016 and various factors related to voting machine 
performance, partisanship, and election laws.  The analysis produced mixed results when 
examining the role of voting machine performance — depending on the specification, DREs 
produced slightly more or slightly fewer residual votes.  It also produced a counter-intuitive 
Table 9.  Regression of residual vote rate on two-party margin of victory at the state 
level, 2000–2016. 
 
 Year 
 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Margin-of-
victory 
-0.002 
(0.015) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.025** 
(0.008) 
Intercept 1.93*** 
(0.24) 
0.99*** 
(0.15) 
1.03*** 
(0.13) 
0.87***
(0.09) 
1.03*** 
(0.16) 
R2 .00 .02 .00 .04 .19 
Adj. R2 -.03 -0.01 -.02 .01 .17 
N 38 39 42 44 45 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Source:  Data gathered by the authors and Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. 
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finding that states with liberal write-in laws saw higher residual vote rates than states that did not 
allow write-in votes at all.   
Finally, perhaps the most interesting finding is that counties at both extremes of the 
partisan perspective — the strongest Democratic and Republican counties — had lower residual 
vote rates than counties with more balanced partisanship.  While it is always dangerous to make 
individual-level inferences from aggregate data, this finding does suggest that strong partisans 
were probably less likely to abstain than weak partisans.  This would not be a surprising finding, 
except for the fact that some might imagine that the bad blood between Clinton and Sanders 
supporters would have had the greatest effect in the bluest of counties.  Instead, the exact 
opposite appears to have been true. 
Much of the analysis in this section has examined state-level factors that might influence 
variations in the residual vote rate, some of which are independent of the abstention hypothesis.  
We found, ironically enough, that more liberal write-in laws were associated with higher residual 
vote rates in 2016, and that a greater reliance on mail ballots was also associated with higher 
residual vote rates.  Finally, higher residual vote rates were associated with states that were less 
competitive, and thus places where an abstention, or even a vote for a minor-party candidate, 
would be less likely to be “wasted.” 
 
IV. The Residual Vote Rate in Recent History 
The major story in the residual vote rate over the past twenty years has been its dramatic decline 
after the 2000 presidential election, in the wake of the wave of new voting machines and 
administrative practices that swept over election administration after the Florida recount fiasco.  
A new chapter in the residual vote rate was written in 2016, when it rose nearly a point compared 
to 2012, and approached the level of 2000. 
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 This raises an interesting question:  had there not been a wave of new voting machines 
adopted by local jurisdictions after 2000, would the residual vote rate have been even higher in 
2016 than what we observed?  The answer is “yes,” as the following analysis demonstrates. 
 Here, we expand the analysis originally undertaken by Ansolabehere and Stewart (2004) 
and Stewart (2006), which placed the estimation of the residual vote rate in a fixed-effected 
framework.  To focus on the effects of changing voting technologies, there are two types of 
variables:  (1) a series of dummy variables to indicate the election year and (2) a series of 
dummy variables to indicate the type of voting technology used by a county in year t.  Rather 
than explicitly control for other demographic and administrative practices that might lead to 
inter-county variation in residual vote rates, these factors are accounted for by using county fixed 
effects. 
 Because we include county-level fixed effects, many of the state-level factors we 
explored above are outside the scope of analysis.  The focus here is on the role of technology and 
national factors that are common to all states and counties. 
 The analysis was performed on a dataset that included observations from every 
presidential election from 1988 to 2016.  County is the unit of analysis.  Because the number of 
states requiring counties to report turnout has grown over the years, the number of counties 
reflected in each year’s analysis grows as well, growing from 1,354 in 1988 to 2,450 in 2016. 
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Table 10.  Residual vote rates, 1988–2016, with machine effects included.  County fixed 
effects. 
 
Variables 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Year   
1988 0.0057*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0049*** 
(0.0004) 
1992 -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011* 
(0.0004) 
1996 0.0019*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0011** 
(0.0004) 
2000 Excluded Excluded 
 
2004 -0.0083*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0069*** 
(0.0003) 
2008 -0.0083*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0066*** 
(0.0004) 
2012 -0.0092*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0077*** 
(0.0004) 
2016 -0.0046*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0030*** 
(0.0004) 
   
Voting technology (opscan excluded)   
-Punch card — 0.0061*** 
(0.0004) 
-Mechanical lever — -0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
-Paper — -0.0023** 
(0.0006) 
-DRE — -0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-Mixed — -0.0006 
(0.0005) 
Intercept 0.019*** 
(0.0003) 
0.017*** 
(0.0004) 
   
N 16,291 16,291 
R2 .44 .45 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Source:  Data gathered by the authors 
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 The results of this analysis are reported in two columns in Table 10.  In the first column, 
we have simply included the year dummy variables, to describe year-to-year fluctuations in the 
residual vote rate before taking into account changing voting technologies.  Here we see a pattern 
of coefficients that is broadly consistent with the graph in Figure 2.  Because the omitted year is 
2000, the analysis of the year dummies revolves around the pre- and post-HAVA period.  Before 
Florida and the HAVA-era reforms there are two positive coefficients and one coefficient that is 
statistically no different from zero, which indicates that in the late 1980s and 1990s, the residual 
vote rate nationwide was actually greater than what the nation observed in 2000.  While the year 
coefficients after 2000 are all negative, the one associated with 2016 is smaller in magnitude, by 
roughly a factor of two, which is consistent with an increase in the residual vote rate in 2016 
because of an increase in abstentions. 
 The second column adds dummy variables reflecting different voting technologies that 
were used during this period.  This analysis reveals that across this entire period, punch card 
voting machines had residual vote rates that were about 0.62% higher than optical scanners, 
whereas mechanical lever machines and hand-counted paper has a slightly lower residual vote 
rate than optical scanners.   
Because the voting technologies do not appear uniformly across the period covered in the 
regression — punch cards and mechanical lever machines are no longer used and hand-counted 
paper is virtually extinct, while the use of DREs has waxed and waned as optical scanners have 
become steadily more popular — their presence in the regression shifts the size of the year 
dummy variables.  Most notably, the magnitude of the 2016 dummy variable was cut by about 
50% once we accounted for changes to voting technologies.  This suggests that if there had not 
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been a wholesale modernization of voting machines in the 2000s, the residual vote rate in 2016 
might very well have exceeded 2000 by between ½ and 1/3 of a percentage point. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no statistically significant difference in the 
residual vote rates of counties that use DREs or optically scanned ballots.  Because virtually all 
the churning between voting technology types these days is between DREs and optical scanners, 
it is very unlikely that the change in the residual vote rate between 2012 and 2016 is due to the 
migration of counties from one technology (usually DREs) to another (usually optical scanners). 
 
V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
By way of conclusion, we start with the empirical questions that are at the core of this paper.  
The residual vote rate in the 2016 election was nearly a percentage point higher in 2016 than it 
was in 2012.  The multivariate statistical analysis suggests that once we control for county-
specific effects, the pure “year effect” increased the residual vote rate by about half a percentage 
point.  If we were to pick a single cause in this up-tick in the residual vote rate, it would be 
abstention due to alienation from the candidates and, more specifically, abstention among 
Republicans. 
This is the first cut at this analysis, and much more work needs to be done to firmly 
establish abstention-due-to-alienation among Republicans as the primary cause of the residual 
vote rate increase.  However, if this explanation is born out, it would have at least three 
implications for the study of elections and voting systems in the United States. 
First, this analysis opens up the issue of protest voting in the U.S. to further study.  Even 
if protest voting has been uncommon historically in the U.S., the situation may be ripe for it to 
become more frequent in the near future.  For instance, protest voting was in evidence in the 
recent U.S. special election in Alabama, in which Democrat Douglas Jones narrowly defeated 
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Republican Roy Moore by 20,715 votes.24  Moore was seen by many Alabama Republicans as a 
deeply flawed candidate, either by dent of his long-known theocratic views or his more recently-
revealed history of sexual predation as a young man.   
Moore’s candidacy presented a dilemma to loyal Republicans who could not bring 
themselves to crossover and support Jones.  In this case, the preferred action was not leaving the 
ballot blank,25 but rather, casting a write-in vote. 
In that race, 22,780 write-in votes were cast, or enough potentially to have swung the 
results of the election.  The prevalence of write-in votes was the greatest in both the most 
staunchly Republican counties of the state and in the counties that most supported Moore’s 
opponent in the Republican primary, Luther Strange.26  Thus, the write-in vote in Alabama 
proved to be a consequential protest vote. 
A second implication of the analysis in this paper is that abstention as an electoral choice 
may be under-appreciated by relying on public opinion surveys to study the phenomenon.  As we 
note in the body of the paper, the rate of abstention in the 2016 presidential election  that was 
revealed through answers to the CCES was an order-of-magnitude less than was seems most 
likely from an analysis of aggregate election returns.  Why abstainers are under-represented in 
                                                 
24 These are the unofficial election night results as of December 21, 2017.  See Alabama Secretary of State, 
“Alabama Votes,” http://www2.alabamavotes.gov/electionNight/statewideResultsByContest.aspx?ecode=1000915.  
25 There were only 1,780 residual votes reported in the unofficial election night results, or 0.13% of votes cast.  
There appears to be no correlation between the residual vote rate and support for Moore or Republican candidates 
more generally.  The only factor explaining a few outlying counties (Baldwin, Geneva, Lamar, Lowndes, Madison, 
Marengo, Tallapoosa, and Washington) was that these counties also had tax-rate questions on the county ballot, and 
apparently several hundred voters showed up to vote on these questions while abstaining from the question of U.S. 
senator. 
26 The correlation between the percentage of write-in votes in the special election and the vote for Strange in the 
primary was .30, while the correlation between the write-in vote and Trump’s share of the presidential vote in 2016 
was .31.  Because support for strange and support for Trump in the general election are negatively correlated, the 
fact that both are positively correlated with write-in votes indicates that each is tapping into the two important 
factors that drove the write-in vote:  Republican Party loyalty and opposition to Moore. 
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the CCES remains for speculation at this point.27  It may be that respondents to public opinion 
surveys are less prone to abstention, or that there is a social desirability bias involved in giving 
an “abstention” answer.  In either case, this is a phenomenon that may be inherently difficult to 
discern with any precision using survey research, owing to the fact that the secret ballot makes it 
impossible to verify whether respondents answer the vote-choice question accurately.   
Although there are certainly methodological barriers to the use of aggregate analysis to 
gauge the extent of abstention in presidential elections, the approach taken in this paper to 
explaining fluctuations in the residual vote rate over time is promising for estimating changes in 
the abstention rate from election-to-election.  The drawback to this method, represented here by 
the results reported in Table 10, is that year-specific dummy variables included in a fixed effects 
regression pick up changes in the residual vote rate that are not confined to intentional 
abstention.  For instance, the sharp decline in the residual vote rate from 2000 and 2004 was 
probably not caused entirely by a drop in abstentions across these two years, although that may 
have been part of the story.28  Instead, most of the explanation for this drop has been in terms of 
administrative practices that were implemented in the wake of the 2000 Bush v. Gore affair.  In 
any event, the analysis in this paper suggests that year-to-year fluctuations in the residual vote 
rate are politically interesting in their own right, and deserve more study. 
Finally, the analysis presented here suggests caution in the use of the residual vote rate to 
assess the accuracy of voting machines, and especially its use in comparing across jurisdictions, 
as is done in the Elections Performance Index (EPI).  The use of the residual vote rate is justified 
                                                 
27 We note that the ANES in 2016 did not even give respondents a clear opportunity to report that they abstained in 
the presidential contest. 
28 The argument in favor of interpreting the drop in the residual vote rate from 2000 to 2004, controlling for changes 
in voting technology and county-specific fixed effects, as evidence of a decline in abstentions is that the close 2000 
election kicked up party competition in the ensuing years, especially in battleground states, thus reducing the portion 
of the electorate that was indifferent between the two political parties.  Overall turnout certainly surged between 
2000 and 2004, which has been used as evidence of this intensification of partisan electoral animosities across these 
years. 
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in the EPI based on its success in quantifying the relative performance of voting machine types 
as documented in the academic literature.  In the 2012 EPI, Kansas, the state with the highest 
residual vote rate, at 2.2%, is penalized in comparison with the other states, most of which had 
residual vote rates of 1.0% or less.  This seems like a fair assessment, given the fact that most 
states have gotten down to 1.0% or less by adopting new equipment and new practices.  For 
whatever reason, Kansas had failed to see the gains in machine performance that were evident in 
other states, and as a consequence its voters experienced more “lost votes” on Election Day than 
voters in other states. 
However, given the way that the EPI is constructed, an increase in the residual vote rate 
due to abstention is currently no different than an increase due to the disintegration of a state’s 
voting machines.  At the very least, efforts such as the EPI should normalize for abstentions, 
perhaps through a simple dummy-variable approach represented by the analysis in Table 10.  
The limitation of this approach, of course, is that if all states improve the accuracy of their voting 
machines at the same time, as was virtually the case between 2000 and 2004, then no states get 
credit for that improvement. 
To conclude, most students of elections focus on who wins and loses, and explanations 
for electoral outcomes.  That’s as it should be.  However, other things are also revealed through 
the patterns of election returns that go beyond the winners and losers.  One of those patterns has 
to do with the residual vote, the failure of some voters to provide a counted vote for the 
president.  Understanding the causes of residual votes is important for understanding the nature 
of American electoral democracy, regardless of their source.  When residual votes are caused due 
to voting machine breakdown and ballot confusion, the will of the voters is undermined.  When 
residual votes are caused by intentional abstentions, there are lessons in the returns about how 
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voters view the choices before them.  What the 2016 election shows is that at least for one 
presidential election, abstention was a choice made by many with the intention to send a 
message.  The question for the future is whether 2016 was an anomaly, the beginning of a trend, 
or a sign of an interesting political phenomenon we have been ignoring all along. 
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